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EVIDENCE IN MOTOR CARRIER APPLICATION CASES
EVERETT HUTCHINSON* and GEORGE M. CHANDLER**

The Motor Carrier Act of 19351 brought under regulation by the
Interstate Commerce Commission the operation of for-hire motor
carriers. The act, which is now part II of the Interstate Commerce
Act, requires all such motor carriers, with certain exceptions, 2 to
obtain operating authority from the Commission. Carriers operating
prior to the passage of the act were granted authority under "grandfather" provisions 3 by a mere showing of past operations, but carriers
entering the field since that date or desiring to extend their operations are required to prove that there is a public need for the service
which they propose. A common carrier by motor vehicle must show
that the proposed operation is required by the present or future public
convenience and necessity,4 while a contract carrier, in the words of
the act, must show that the proposed operation would be consistent
with the public interest and the national transportation policy.5
This discussion will be limited primarily to a consideration of the
evidence presented in common carrier application proceedings to
prove public convenience and necessity.
The term "public convenience and necessity" is not defined by
statute, but it has been applied to the regulation of transportation for
a number of years. It appeared in the Transportation Act of 19206
in sections dealing .with the building and abandonment of rail lines.
In construing these phrases the Supreme Court has said:
The purpose of paragraphs 18 to 22 is to prevent interstate carriers from
weakening themselves by constructing or operating superfluous lines,
and to protect them from being weakened by another carrier's operating
in interstate commerce a competing line not required in the public interest.7
In one of its earliest motor carrier cases, Pan-American Bus Lines
* Commissioner and Chairman of Division 1, Interstate Commerce Commission; B.B.A. and LL.B., University of Texas; member of the Texas and United
States Supreme Court bars.
** Attorney Advisor, Bureau of Operating Rights, Interstate Commerce
Commission; A.B. Lawrence College, LL.B. University of Illinois; member of
the Illinois bar.
1. Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543, as amended; 49
U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1952).

2. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1952).

3. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1); § 309(a) (1) (1952).
4. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 307 (1952).
5.49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 309 (b) (1952).
6. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (18)-(20) (1952).
7. Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Northside Belt Ry., 276 U.S. 475, 479

(1928). See also, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65
(1945).

1053

1054

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 11

8
Operation,
the Commission, in applying the term "public convenience and necessity" to motor carrier regulation, said, in language
which has frequently been reiterated:

The question, in substance, is whether the new operation or service will
serve a useful public purpose, responsive to a public demand or need;
whether this purpose can and will be served as well by existing lines
or carriers; and whether it can be served by applicant with the new operation or service proposed without endangering or impairing the operations
of existing carriers contrary to the public interest. 9
The words "convenience" and "necessity" are not synonymous, and
each must be given its own distinct meaning. The Commission has
said "that the word 'necessity' must be somewhat liberally construed,
for there are comparatively few things in life which can be regarded
as an absolute 'necessity,' and it was surely not the intent of Congress
to use the word in so strict and narrow a sense."10 The word "convenience," however, is construed more strictly. It has been held that
the need of the shipping public for additional transportation service
does not exist unless, without the service proposed, "the inconvenience
would be so great as to amount to an unreasonable burden on the community."1
Proof of public convenience and necessity in application proceedings
is directed primarily to the need of the public for additional service
and to the alleged inability of existing authorized carriers to provide
that service. In addition, other considerations relating to safety and
the public interest are relevant to these proceedings. Such matters
are well illustrated in cases involving the transportation of dangerous
traffic, and will be considered later in connection with a discussion of
12
Riss & Co., Inc.
The Commission is directed, in administering the provisions of
the act, to carry out the national transportation policy as expressed
by Congress.' 3 As far as application cases are concerned, this means
8. 1 M.C.C. 190 (1936). Decisions of the Commission may be made by the
entire Commission or by one of its divisions, consisting of at least three
Commissioners. The decision in the case cited was by former division 5, while
most motor carrier application proceedings are now handled by division 1.
In most instances this distinction will not be noted in this article, and decisions
will be referred to simply as those of the Commission.
9. 1 M.C.C. at 203.
10. Id. at 202; Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co., 6 M.C.C. 477 (1938).
11. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 41 M.C.C. 713, 716 (1943).
12. 64 M.C.C. 299 (1955). See pp. 1077-78, infra.
13. 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 1001 note (1952); preceding § 1 of the
Interstate Commerce Act:
"It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress
to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve
the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and
efficient service and to foster sound economic conditions in transportation and
among the several carriers; td encourage the establishment and maintenance
of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discrimina-
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that it is the duty of the Commission not only to preside over adversary proceedings, but also to represent the public interest in these
proceedings. Hearing officers are expected to develop the facts for
the record so that the Commission may reach an informed decision.
The Commission, in a case in which a party had objected to the examiner's suggestion to counsel that he develop more fully certain facts,
said:
Proceedings before us are not strictly adversary proceedings with the applicant on one side and opposing carriers on the other. On the contrary,
the public is in effect the principal party to all such proceedings. Regulation is in the public interest, and it cannot be fair and effective unless
we have before us all the pertinent facts. It is not only the privilege
but the duty of presiding hearing officers, after counsel have had their
opportunity, to participate in the questioning of witnesses with a view
toward the proper and complete development of all pertinent facts.14
In making its decisions the Commission must consider the needs
of the shipping public as a whole, the effect which a grant of authority
would have on the operations of applicant's competitors, whether they
are motor, rail, or water carriers, and how the "inherent advantages"
of each form of transportation may best be preserved. 15
EVIDENCE AND PRoCEDURE IN GENERAL

Inasmuch as Interstate Commerce Commission procedure may not
be familiar to all readers, it might be helpful to consider briefly the
course run by a typical application for motor carrier operating rights.
Procedure is governed by the Commission's General Rules of Practice 16 which provide, insofar as rules of evidence are concerned, that
evidence admissible in matters, not involving trial by jury, tried in
the courts of the United States shall be admissible in Commission hearings. This rule goes on to state:
The rules of evidence shall be applied in any proceeding to the end
that needful and proper evidence shall be conveniently, inexpensively,
and speedily produced, while preserving the substantial rights of the
parties.17
tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive
practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials
thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions;--all
to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to
meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of
policy."
14. Murrow's Transfer, Inc., 61 M.C.C. 599, 606 (1953).
15. This last point is discussed below in connection with the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
16. 49 C.F.R. 1, effective October 1, 1956, as amended.
The rules governing motor carrier application proceedings are found in
49 C.F.R. 1.241.
17. 49 C.F.R. 1.75.
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An application proceeding is instituted by the filing of the application, the substance of which is published, together with the time
and place of hearing, in the Federal Register, to give notice to those
who may be affected by a grant of authority sought. Those desiring
to oppose the application may file a written protest with the Commission and the applicant' 8 or may give notice of intention to protest
to the applicant and to the Commission 10 days prior to the date of
the hearing. 19 A carrier failing to file such a notice may be permitted
to intervene and to become a party to the proceeding by presenting
a petition for intervention at the hearing, but whether this interven20
tion should be allowed is at the discretion of the hearing officer.
Hearings may be conducted by one or more commissioners, by a
hearing examiner, or, in appropriate circumstances, by a joint board
composed of members nominated by the individual states in which
the applicant wishes to operate.21 Following the hearing, the hearing
officer files with the Commission his report containing his findings
and conclusions and his recommended order. Parties adversely affected
have a specified period of time, usually 30 days, after the service of
this report and recommended order in which to file exceptions, to
which other parties may reply. If no exceptions are filed to the report
and order recommended by the examiner, it becomes effective as
the order of the Commission by operation of law unless for good
cause it is stayed by the Commission on its own motion. If exceptions are filed the case becomes the subject of a report and order of
the Commission, usually by division 1.22 Following the issuance of
this report and order, the parties may petition for reconsideration by
the entire Commission. Final decisions of the Commission may be
reviewed by a three-judge district court, 23 and the order of such a
24
court may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Admissibility of evidence
It is well established that administrative tribunals are not governed by mechanical rules for the admission of evidence, and that an
administrative decision will not be overturned by the courts because
of the admission of evidence which, upon further consideration, is
25
found to be immaterial, incompetent, or of no probative value.
18. 49 C.F.R. 1.40.
19. 49 C.F.R. 1.241(c).
20. This rule has been in effect since October 1, 1956. Prior to that date, one
could appear as an intervenor and become a party to the proceeding merely
by appearing at the hearing. See Arrow Transp. Co., 73 M.C.C. 261 (1957).
21. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended; 49 U.S.C. § 305 (1952).
22. See note 8, supra.
23. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended; 49 U.S.C. § 305(g) (1952) of the Interstate Commerce Act; Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1952).
24. 62 Stat. 926 1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1952).

25. Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930).
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The Commission is the sole judge of the weight to be given to the
evidence of record, and its decisions will not be disturbed by the
courts unless it has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or in the absence
of any convincing evidence whatever. 26 As a consequence, it is the
practice of the Commission to take a liberal attitude toward the
admission of evidence. Of course, evidence which is clearly improper
27
or irrelevant or which is merely repetitive will not be admitted.
In admitting exhibits into evidence the Commission has been consistently strict in requiring that persons- familiar with the records or
statements offered be available for cross-examination. 28 Where the
applicant presents his evidence in the form of affidavits under the
modified or no-hearing procedure,2 9 protestants may request that applicant's witnesses be made available for cross-examination at an oral
hearing. In one instance an application was supported by two shipper
witnesses whose affidavits were submitted with the application. At
the hearing for cross-examination, the affiants themselves did not
appear, but two other representatives of the same shippers were
present. It was held that the original affidavits might stand inasmuch
as the witnesses available for cross-examination had personal knowledge of the matters which they contained. One witness was unfamiliar with a portion of the subject matter of one of the verified
statements, and that statement was rejected to this extent.30
Where an exhibit consists of an abstract compiled from business
records, the original records must be available at the hearing for
examination by opposing parties. The leading recent case in this area
is Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc.31 In an alternate route application, the applicant must prove, among other things, that it is transporting a substantial amount of traffic over its presently authorized route,
and that it is competing effectively with other carriers in the area.
This is ordinarily done through exhibits of shipping documents showing the tonnage transported. In the Campbell case, the applicant
presented as an exhibit an abstract of freight bills containing this
information. Instead of the original freight bills, it had at the hearing
International Business Machine punch cards made from the original
shipping documents. It was held that the abstract was inadmissible
in the absence of original authenticating records, and the application
was denied. At the further hearing in this case, applicant made available microfilm copies of its freight bills, the originals having been
destroyed. It was held that these copies constituted the best evidence
26. Loving v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Okla. 1940).

27. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 71 M.C.C. 359, 361 (1957); Inter-City

Trucking Co., 4 M.C.C. 155 (1938); Beckel & Ziebell, 2 M.C.C. 517 (1937).
28. John G. Reeser, 9 M.C.C. 528 (1938).
29. As provided in the General Rules of Practice, 49 C.F.R. 1.44-1.54.
30. Meyer Extension, 74 M.C.C. 761 (1958).
31. 63 M.C.C. 569 (1955).
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obtainable, and that the exhibits prepared from them were properly
admitted.32 Where no timely objection is made by opposing parties,
and where an abstract's accuracy is not challenged, it may be admitted into evidence and considered in spite of the fact that the
original underlying documents are not available at the hearing. 33
In handling problems involving the admission of hearsay evidence,
the Commission seems generally inclined to admit it, with the reservation that it may not be used as proof of the truth of the hearsay
statement, but merely as evidence that such a statement was made.3
In one case, however, evidence by mayors and councilmen of certain
municipalities proposed to be served by a new bus service was held
to have been improperly admitted as hearsay. The Commission stated
there that their testimony ".

.

. purported to state the views of their

electorate and, at best, reflected only the opinion of the persons
testifying." 35 This decision, however, seems to be somewhat out of
line with other Commission cases, especially those involving bus
line applications. 36 In another such case, for example, an application
was granted which was supported only by the management of an
37
apartment house project and a local citizens' association.
Official notice
The Interstate Commerce Commission, like other administrative
bodies, may take official notice of various facts which are not, strictly
speaking, matters of record in the proceeding before it. Perhaps the
best example of this may be found in United States v. Pierce Auto
FreightLines, Inc.38 This proceeding involved two cases which were
heard on separate records but which, since they involved related
issues, were disposed of in single reports by the examiner and the
Commission. The Supreme Court found that the Commission's report ".

.

. so commingles the two cases that it is impossible to de-

termine which statements are supported by which record," 39 but
it nevertheless upheld the Commission's action, noting that the
parties in both proceedings were identical and that no prejudice could
have arisen. It went on to say that the court has limited matters of
which the Commission may take official notice to insure that the
parties obtain a fair hearing. It then said,
32. 71 M.C.C. 401 (1957).
33. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 69 M.C.C. 49 (1956).
34. Michaud's Bus Line, Inc., 67 M.C.C. 711 (1956).
35. Shumpert Extension, 68 M.C.C. 385, 388 (1956).
36. See cases discussed at pp. 1074-77, infra.
37. W. M. A. Transit Co., No. MC-3677 (Sub-No. 35), December 20, 1957,
not printed in full.
Another type of evidence usually held to be inadmissible is evidence of
shipments transported by applicant without authority. McBride's Express,
Inc., 72 M.C.C. 32 (1957).
38. 327 U.S. 515 (1946).
39. 327 U.S. at 528.
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But in doing so it has not undertaken to make a fetish of sticking squarely
within the four corners of the specific record in administrative proceedings or of pinning down such agencies, with reference to fact determinations, even more rigidly than the courts in strictly judicial proceedings.
On the contrary, in the one case as in the other, the mere fact that the
determining body has looked beyond the record proper does not invalidate its action unless substantial prejudice is shown to result.4 o

Perhaps the most common incident of taking official notice is where
the Commission's own records are involved. This commonly occurs
where authority to perform the same operation for which an applicant
seeks authority is issued to another carrier subsequent to the hearing
but prior to the final determination in the considered proceeding. 41
Another example is found in a case where, although a need for the
proposed service is found to exist, issuance of a certificate is withheld pending determination of applicant's fitness in another proceeding.4
Burden of proof
It is well established that the burden is upon the applicant to
establish by substantial evidence that the public convenience and,
necessity require the granting of the authority sought.4 3 The applicant
must show not only that his services are considered necessary to the
shipping public, but he must also show affirmatively that existing
carriers cannot or will not perform the needed service satisfactorily.44
Even if no one opposes the application or if all opposition is withdrawn, the applicant still has the burden of showing by competent
evidence, that there is a definite need for the service which he pro45
poses.
A situation may arise in which the burden is placed upon an applicant of presenting evidence as to the composition, manufacture, or use
of the commodity which he seeks authority to transport so that the
Commission will have before it the necessary information to determine
whether it falls within the operating authority of protesting carriers.
In O'Boyle Tank Lines 4 6 an application was denied on the ground
that the applicant had failed to sustain its burden of proof by establishing, through expert testimony, the "status" of the involved commodities (certain fish oil products) so that the Commission could determine whether a protestant was authorized to transport them under
40. Id. at 530.
41. Ruan Transport Corp., 72 M.C.C. 772 (1957); Peake Extension, 68 M.C.C.
45 (1956); James W. Fore, 66 M.C.C. 179 (1955).
42. C.A.B.Y. Transp. Co., 71 M.C.C. 295 (1956). It is also a common practice
for the Commission to take official notice of such things as maps. Fleetlines,
Inc. v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., 54 M.C.C. 279, 284 (1952).
43. Sinnett v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.N.J. 1955).
44. Clyde R. Sauers, 61 M.C.C. 65, 67 (1952).
45. William L. Dunn, 54 M.C.C. 233 (1952).
46. 67 M.C.C. 502 (1956).
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its liquid chemical authority. In the report on further hearing,47
applicant's contention that it was beyond the scope of its burden of
proof to present evidence relative to a protestant's operating authority
was rejected. In a similar case applicant was required to produce evidence of whether the "processed" milk which he proposed to transport
was an exempt agricultural commodity.48 The rationale of these decisions appears to be that the applicant is in a better position thail
the protestant to obtain the necessary information from the supporting
shipper.
EVIDENCE OF APPLICANT'S FITNESS
The act requires that a certificate shall be issued only if it is
found that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform
the service proposed, 49 and the first order of business in a typical application proceeding is usually the presentation of applicant's operating testimony. The applicant will most likely offer evidence concerning his present operations, tending to show his experience and
ability as a motor carrier,50 and that the service which he proposes
fits in logically with his present operations. Evidence of applicant's
safety record, his safety program, and his familiarity with the Commission's safety regulations is offered. He is also likely to testify as
to the type and the amount of the equipment which he operates and
the location and facilities of his terminals. Evidence of financial fitness is usually presented in the form of a current balance sheet statement and other financial data.
As a general rule, the Commission is liberal in finding an applicant
fit, both financially and otherwise. Financial statements may be quite
informal, and still be admissible as proof of fitness. In one case the
financial statement of a partnership in which the business and personal
assets of the, two partners were commingled in some disarray was
found to be satisfactory evidence of financial fitness.5 ' The important
matter is that the necessary information be in evidence, not the form
in which it is presented. One carrier was found financially fit in
a number of instances although it had for some time been operated
by a court-appointed trustee, appointed in bankruptcy proceedings, on
the showing that, while its liabilities exceeded its assets, its current
operations were profitable and its financial position was steadily im47. M. I. O'Boyle & Son, Inc., 72 M.C.C. 788 (1957).

48. Leslie J. Valleskey, 62 M.C.C. 228 (1953).
49. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended; 49

U.S.C. § 307 (1952).

50. The suggestion that inexperience or lack of knowledge of the Commission's regulations might be grounds for finding an applicant unfit seems to
have been made in only one case, A. W. Shipwash, 1 M.C.C. 710 (1937), but
there it also appeared that applicant was financially unfit and that there was
little if any shipper support.
51. Girtz Extension, 68 M.C.C. 789 (1956).
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proving.52 In many cases applicants have been found unfit because
5 3
of past unauthorized operations where violations have been willful.
Frequent violations of the Commission's safety regulations may also
result in a finding that applicant is unfit.5 4 Where operations have
been conducted in good faith or under some color of authority, the
applicant is frequently merely admonished to discontinue his unlawful operations, and a finding of fitness is made.55
S=IPPER TESTIMONY
Generally
Perhaps the most important single item in an applicant's case is
the showing that there is a need for the proposed service. The most
common way of establishing this is by evidence of shipper witnesses,
in the case of property carriers, and prospective passengers, in the
case of bus lines. By "shipper" is meant not only the person who
actually turns a shipment over to a carrier; the term is used to refer
to any member of the public who has an interest in obtaining transportation service. Even though a shipper may not control the routing of
the considered traffic, his testimony concerning the need for service
may be accepted and considered in determining whether the public
convenience and necessity require a particular operation. In Williams
Motor Transfer, Inc.,56 the Commission said:
The fact that the Vermont granite producers do not actually have the
right to control the routing of the considered 'traffic does not render
their testimony concerning transportation conditions inadmissible or
materially affect its weight.... Despite vestiture of control technically in
the consignees, the producers have a very definite interest in obtaining
a prompt and dependable service for the distribution of their products.
Evidence that only one shipper requires service is enough to warrant a grant of authority, since each individual member of the shipping
public is entitled to necessary transportation service. 57 On the other
hand, the fact that a large number of witnesses either support or
oppose an application is not necessarily of paramount importance. In
Southern Express, Inc.,58 representatives of some 500 shippers testified
,in opposition to the application to the effect that existing transporta52. Miller Motor Line of North Carolina, Inc., 64 M.C.C. 811 (1955) (not
printed in full).
53. Loudon Transfer, Inc., 71 M.C.C. 224 (1957); Samuel Bass, 66 M.C.C. 189
(1955); A. R. Davis, 63 M.C.C. 728 (1955).
54. Gray Contract Carrier Application, 69 M.C.C. 695 (1957).
55. Paladino Common Carrier Application, No. MC-115537, May 29, 1958;
Park Trucking & Supply, Inc., Ext., Wisconsin, 68 M.C.C. 343 (1956); Garrison Fast Freight, Inc., 67 M.C.C. 550 (1956).

56. 67 M.C.C. 735, 739 (1956); Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., 72 M.C.C.

653 (1957).

57. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc., 73 M.C.C. 169 (1957).
58. 62 M.C.C. 35, 43 (1953).
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tion service was satisfactory. Protestants claimed to have presented
a better cross-section of public opinion than the applicant. In rejecting this contention, the Commission said that its function was
to draw its own conclusions from the material facts, and not to rely
on the consensus of opinion of witnesses.
A shipper witness will ordinarily testify as to the nature of the
traffic which is being shipped, the volume of this traffic, and the
points from and to which the traffic will move. In addition, the shipper
will usually indicate the manner in which the traffic is presently
moving and why the existing services are considered inadequate. The
Commission has said that an applicant for authority to transport meats
from points in Florida supplied all the proof that could be reasonably
expected by showing ". . . past shipments, shippers' marketing procedure, the location of potential consignees, instances of business lost
by shippers because of inability to ship, and inquiries received by
'59
shippers from potential customers.
There are many reasons why a shipper may appear in support of
a motor carrier's application, and the evidence presented in application proceedings therefore assumes a variety of forms. It is theoretically possible, of course, that a concern may move into new
quarters in an area which is completely without any public transportation facilities whatsoever. In this case, an applicant seeking authority to serve this shipper would have a relatively easy time of it.
However, such a situation is not common, and even in cases where
no other carriers are sufficiently interested in the traffic to oppose an
application, there are usually other motor or rail carriers serving
the area in question. The usual situation is one in which there are
other carriers which express at least some interest in the shipper's
traffic.
Preference
The shipper may desire a new service merely because it prefers
to use the services of a particular carrier. The Commission has held
on numerous occasions that mere preference for a particular carrier
is not sufficient to warrant a grant of authority.60 This principle is
usually followed even where the commodity is something of unique
value'or requiring some special care or handling.61 There are certain
instances in which a grant has been made in circumstances which
make it look as if preference was given some weight. Where a carrier
is presently serving a shipper in the transportation of certain of its
products or to certain destination points, that carrier may be granted
59. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 64 M.C.C. 657, 659 (1955); Southern
Kansas Greyhound Lines v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
60. Clyde R. Sauers, 61 M.C.C. 65 (1952); Cf. W. R. Fields, 21 M.C.C. 788
(1940).
61. Sayre Extension, 68 M.C.C. 39 (1956) (A case involving race horses).
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authority to carry an additional commodity or serve additional points
so as to provide the shipper with a complete service. This is most
likely to be the case where the shipper requires service on mixed
truckloads of the commodities which the applicant can already handle
together with those for which authority is sought, or where the
shipper has less-than-truckload shipments to points in both the
carrier's present and proposed destination territory. This type of
situation will not produce a grant of authority if it means that existing
carriers will be deprived of traffic which they are presently handling
satisfactorily, but a grant is likely to result where the proposed
operation covers new traffic, and no other carrier would be adversely
62
affected by a loss of present business.
Closely related to the matter of preference is the situation in which
a shipper desires the services of a particular carrier because of some
condition peculiar to his business or the location of his plant. In
one case a shipper required the service of a local carrier because his
loading facilities were so limited that there was room for only one
trailer to load at a time, and the carrier had to be in a position to
supply equipment on exceedingly short notice.6 3 In another, an application was granted primarily because the applicant was able to supply
automobile trailers suitable for the transportation of small foreignmade cars.64
Carriersserving a particularindustry
Where it appears that a carrier's principal business consists of
transportation services rendered for a particular industry, changing
conditions in that industry-the use of new raw materials or the development of new products-may justify a grant of additional commodity authority. A carrier whose operations are confined to supplying the needs of the textile industry, for example, has been granted
additional authority to enable it to transport synthetic fabrics in
addition to cotton and wool.65 A somewhat similar situation may arise
where the entire industrial complexion of a city or region undergoes
a change. In Wright Trucking, Inc.,66 applicant held authority to transport general commodities from Philadelphia to Lowell, Massachusetts,
62. Sidney B. Stanley, 52 M.C.C. 253, 259 (1950); Speedway Transports, Inc.,
No. MC-106282 (Sub-No. 6), April 30, 1958; Cf. Shaw & Bogan Contract Carrier Application, 72 M.C.C. 275 (1957).
63. George E. Nelson, 66 M.C.C. 3 (1955).
64. Great Lakes Forwarding Corp., 72 M.C.C. 739 (1957).
65. L. Nelson & Sons Transp. Co., 62 M.C.C. 271 (1953), Affd, A. B. & C.

Motor Transp. Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 367 (D. Mass. 1956); accord,
Nova's Express, Inc., 73 M.C.C. 455 (1957). It has been the Commission's
practice to formulate commodity descriptions and motor carrier classifications
which will enable carriers serving a particular industry to render that industry
a complete transportation service. See, Classification of Motor Carriers of
Property, 2 M.C.C. 703 (1937) and Descriptions in Motor Carrier Certificates,
61 M.C.C. 209 (1952).
66. 71 M.C.C. 131 (1957).
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and specified textile mill products on return. He sought authority to
carry general commodities southbound as well. The evidence indicated that the textile industry in Lowell was being replaced by a
number of small plants producing a wide variety of commodities. It
was noted in the report that applicant would have to adapt its operations to the changing traffic if it was to stay in business. Upon a
showing that existing service on small shipments was not always
satisfactory and of a general need for such service, the application
was granted.
Followingthe traffic
A shipper may also desire a new motor carrier service because it
is building a new plant, either as a replacement or a supplement to
its former facilities. In the former case, applicant will often seek additional authority on the principle that he has the right to "follow the
traffic" and continue to serve a shipper which he has served in the
past. In Petroleum Transp. Co.. 7 former division 5 granted authority
to an applicant which was faced with the possibility of losing a substantial amount of its business because of the development of the
Columbia River, resulting in a change in shipping points of petroleum
products. In granting the application, the division, said, "In the circumstances, it is our opinion that we should view the issues herein
as merely permitting applicant to continue to perform the same
Although this language might be
service as it has heretofore."
interpreted as establishing a "follow-the-traffic" doctrine, such an
interpretation was rejected in the leading case in this area, Smith &
Solomon Trucking Co.69 The Commission concluded there that it
could not properly grant operating authority on a showing of loss of
traffic alone without additional evidence of lack of adequate service at
the new location. In this respect it said:
Common-carrier authority may be issued only for the purpose of providing
service to the general public without selection or discrimination. There
is no basis in the law as written which permits a common carrier to
"belong" to a particular shipper, or, conversely, a shipper to belong
70
to a particular common carrier.
The report goes on to discuss the Commission's obligation under the
national transportation policy to foster sound economic conditions in
transportation. The conclusion reached was that a case of this type
must be treated as any other, and that the effect on the carriers already
in the field must be given full consideration.
Exceptions to the Smith & Solomon rule have been recognized.
67.
68.
69.
70.

19 M.C.C. 637 (1939).
Id. at 639.
61 M.C.C. 748 (1953).
Id. at 752.
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In Helm's Express, Inc.,71 division 1 permitted a carrier to follow its
principal shipper, emphasizing the fact that existing carriers would
not be adversely affected due to the large volume of traffic involved,
the fact that they had not enjoyed this traffic previously, and the
added fact that the absence of other industry in the area would make
it impossible for the applicant to solicit other traffic being handled by
existing carriers. Another situation in which the Smith & Solomon
case has not been followed is that in which a shipper had some special
transportation problem which the applicant was experienced in
handling. For example, a carrier which had formerly served, at
another location, a shipper of custom-made display cases, was granted
authority to conduct this operation from the shipper's new plant,
largely because of the fragile nature of the articles involved, the
shipper's difficulty in adhering to a predictable shipping schedule, and
the necessity of timing the arrival of shipments in coordination with
the schedules of installation contractors. 2
Proof of future need
Where the supporting shipper is interested in a new motor carrier
service primarily because it plans to enter a new sales territory or
hopes to sell a new product, an applicant is faced with the problem of
proving a future need for service. It has been held that if the supporting shipper merely has hopes of obtaining new customers from
its competitors but has no definite plan for securing new business,
the application must be denied on the ground that the evidence is
too speculative to warrant a grant of authority. 3 General requests
by a shipper's salesmen for motor carrier service have been held insufficient to support a grant. 74 However, where the commodity involved is such that the shipper's customers are unlikely to order it
until adequate transportation services are made available, a grant of
authority could result even in the absence of an appreciable customer
demand. For example, there is a trend in many industries toward
the use of commodities in bulk, but a user of bulk sugar or liquid wax
is not likely to install expensive bulk storage facilities until it is
certain that transportation for bulk commodities is available.7 5
Before new authority is granted in a situation involving proof of
future need, the supporting shipper must present substantial evidence
that the traffic will actually materialize. It need not give actual
production figures nor state the exact volume of freight that will
71. 67 M.C.C. 183 (1956).
72. Cadden Extension, No. MC-95607 (Sub-No. 4), June 26, 1957, not reported in full.
73. Robert E. Paup, 63 M.C.C. 139 (1954).
74. Kuhns Extension, 72 M.C.C. 681 (1957).

75. Groendyke Transport, Inc., No. MC-111401 (Sub-No. 80) July 31, 1957,

not printed in full. H. L. & F. McBride, 62 M.C.C. 779, 789 (1954).
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.move,76 but a positive estimate of the potential flow of traffic, which
could not materialize without the inauguration of the service proposed
by-the applicant, should be presented.77 The Commission has established the standard in this language:
Future need for a proposed service may be established by a showing that
the supporting shippers are actually soliciting business or have some
definite plan upon which it can be reasonably found that the commodities sought to be transported will move in the near future. Here, the
shippers have salesmen in the destination territory and have received
inquiries from customers concerning the considered commodity.78
A similar situation may arise when a regular route carrier seeks
authority to operate over a highway which is not yet completed. It
has been held that such authority may be granted if it is established
with reasonable certainty that the highway actually will be completed
79
and opened to the public in the discernible future.
Investigation of existing service
An important item which will almost always be brought out by
an applicant in the course of shipper testimony is why the shipper considers the existing transportation services to be unsatisfactory. The
burden is upon the applicant to establish this element of the case, and
it is not a matter which is left to the protestants to bring out in rebuttal. Before an application can be granted it must appear that the
shipper has made an investigation of available existing service. Authorized carriers are not required to seek out the shipper, and the fact
that an opposing carrier has not actively solicited the business of the
supporting shipper is of no particular importance. The applicant is
required to show that the shipper has tried and failed to obtain service,
or that service, when provided, was unsatisfactory. 8o
Single-line versus joint-line service
There are many reasons why a shipper may consider existing service
to be unsatisfactory. The motor carrier service available may be
solely joint-line, and the shipper's products may be subject to spoilage or breakage, chances of which would be increased by the
necessity for transfer of lading in transit or the delay which might
occur at interchange points.81 Transit time is almost always an im-

portant consideration for a shipper, and joint-line service is generally
slower than direct. In Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc.,8 2 appli76. Schreiber Trucking Co., Inc., 73 M.C.C. 53, 58 (1957).
77. Rowley Interstate Transp. Co., Inc., 67 M.C.C. 415 (1956).
78. Earl Clarence Gibbon, 67 M.C.C. 252, 253 (1956).
79. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 71 M.C.C. 335 (1957).
80. Warren Transport, Inc., 69 M.C.C. 241 (1956); John G. Miller, 61 M.C.C.
631, 637 (1953).
81. J. &L. Transp. Co., Inc., 52 M.C.C. 413 (1951).
82. 64 M.C.C. 511 (1955).
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cant, an automobile carrier, offered an extensive exhibit showing
the single-line services available to competitors of the supporting
shipper to points in the involved destination territory. In granting
the authority sought, the Commission noted that the shipper's competitors had available from one to five different single-line services
to these points. It said, "[A]lthough the number of carriers available
to a competitor is not controlling on the question of a shipper's need
for additional service, it is indicative of what is desired and deemed
necessary in the industry."83 The Commission further noted that the
shipper found single-line motor service preferable to joint-line because of speed in transit, reduction in damage, ease and promptness in
tracing shipments, and facility in settling damage claims. Where
existing joint-line service is satisfactory, however, it has frequently
been held that a shipper is not entitled to single-line service as a
matter of right.M Where the commodities are non-perishables and
no particular necessity for exceptionally fast delivery appears, interline service has been found adequate.P
Regular versus irregularroute service
A shipper's dissatisfaction with existing motor carrier service may
result from the fact that the available service is provided exclusively
by either regular or irregular route carriers. In this connection, it
might be well at this point to consider the distinction between these
two types of service. The carrier which operates over regular routes,
serving specified intermediate or off-route points, is usually authorized
to transport general commodities, with certain fairly standard exceptions, such as explosives, household goods, and commodities requiring special equipment because of their size or weight, and is expected to provide a regularly scheduled service over his authorized
routes. The irregular route carrier, on the other hand, operates a
call-and-demand service, and is usually authorized to transport certain
commodities specified by name or class. 86 Shipper evidence might
indicate that a regularly scheduled service on small shipments is
required, whereas existing carriers are able to provide a call-anddemand service only. A much more common situation is that in which
available service is provided only by regular route carriers, while
the shipper requires service to job sites or to other points located off
87
the regular route carrier's routes.
83. Id. at 514.
84. Pine Tree Transp., Inc., 54 M.C.C. 669 (1952).
85. Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc., 73 M.C.C. 285 (1957).
86. Brady Transfer & Storage Co., 47 .C.C. 23 (1947), affd, Brady Transfer
& Storage Co. v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Iowa 1948).
87. Midwest Transfer Co. of Illinois, 74 M.C.C. 564 (1958); Wright Motor
Lines, Inc., 74 M.C.C. 101 (1958). See Turner's Express, Inc., No. MC-110191
(Sub-No. 12), April 7, 1958.
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Cost of transportation
An attempt to obtain less expensive transportation service is often
a cause of a shipper's supporting a motor carrier's application. In
cases where only motor carrier opposition is involved, the Commission
has held consistently that a mere desire to obtain a lower rate, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify the authorization of a new service
in a territory already adequately served. 88 It has been held that the
shipper's remedy in such a situation is not to seek the services of
an additional carrier but to attempt to have the existing rates lowered,
and, if necessary, to file an appropriate complaint against the carrier
which it believes is charging too high a rate.8 9 However, if the
authorized carriers have established rates which are obviously unreasonable or may be said to constitute an embargo against the
traffic, the application may be granted on the basis that existing carriers have demonstrated their unwillingness to participate in the
traffic. In Ewell Extension,90 it was found that motor carrier protestants, about whose rates the supporting shipper complained, had made
no real effort to handle the involved traffic and that their refusal to
negotiate with the shipper about the rate problem indicated "either
a decision to forego the traffic except at their present rates or a lack
of interest in it at rates at which it can move." 91 The application was
92
granted.
Motor versus railservice
Cases of frequent occurrence are those in which the shipper supporting a motor carrier application has available only rail service and
finds that service unsatisfactory. Since situations such as this entail
competition between two different forms of transportation-motor
and rail-they are complicated by the mandate laid down in the
national transportation policy 93 that the Commission take into consideration the inherent advantages of each. In a number of early
decisions the Commission considered this matter in conjunction with
applications to transport bulk liquids, and concluded that in this case
motor carriage has an inherent advantage over rail carriage, and that
shippers of bulk liquid commodities are entitled to adequate service by
88. Gordons Transports, Inc., 61 M.C.C. 521 (1953); Lester A. Dixon &
E. H. Koster, 32 M.C.C. 1 (1942); Jasper & Chicago Motor Express, Inc., 69
M.C.C. 224 (1956) (a case in which the shipper sought a rate advantage by
having all its traffic handled by one carrier). Cases in which there is rail
opposition are discussed immediately below.
89. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(e) (1952). J. J. & E. D.
Wellspeak, 1 M.C.C. 712 (1937).
90. 72 M.C.C. 645 (1957).
91. Id. at 648.
92. Other cases to this effect are: H. L. & F. McBride, 62 M.C.C. 779, 790
(1954); and Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 61 M.C.C. 501, 507-8 (1953).
93. See note 13, supra.
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motor as well as by rail'4 The same conclusion was also reached in
cases involving the transportation of vegetables 95 and of passengers. 96
However, this position was later abandoned, and in Arthur C. Baily,
Jr.,97 an application for authority to transport petroleum in tank
vehicles was denied in the face of only rail opposition, although it was
recognized that rail carriers were unable to give as expeditious service
as the shipper desired.
Finally, in Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, the Supreme
Court specifically considered this matter. The Commission had denied Schaffer's application for authority to transport rough and finished granite, consisting primarily of tombstones, from certain South
Dakota and Vermont quarries to all points in a number of states.99
The denial was based primarily on the grounds that rail service was
adequate and that the shipper's primary interest was to obtain lower
rates. In its opinion remanding the case, the Supreme Court found
that the Commission had failed to give sufficient consideration to the
inherent advantages of motor as compared to rail transportation, and
that the ability of one form of transportation to operate at a lower
rate than another was itself such an inherent advantage. In its report
on reconsideration the Commission gave further attention to the
various inherent advantages of motor carrier service, and granted
the application. 100 In doing so, the following considerations were
stressed: both shippers and receivers were located at some distance
from rail sidings, which meant that shipments had to be handled by
motor carriers as well as by rail, sometimes at both ends of the
movement, thus increasing the chance of damage and delay; that
rail service on small shipments was slow and unpredictable, resulting
in delayed deliveries and loss of business to competitors having motor
carrier service; that finished tombstones were easily scratched, stained,
and chipped, and that damage was greater when shipments moved by
rail than when they moved by motor; that shipping costs, such as
crating, were increased when rail service was used; and that consignees preferred to maintain small inventories, which was only
possible where expeditious transportation service was available. In
view of all these considerations, the Commission concluded that a
grant of authority was warranted without taking into account the
alleged rate advantage of motor over rail service. 101
94. Columbia Terminals Co., 9 M.C.C. 727 (1938); Edwin A. Bowles, 1 M.C.C.

589 (1937).
95. Ernest L. Johnson, 10 M.C.C. 4 (1938).
96. Oregon Motor Stages, 18 M.C.C. 732 (1939).
97. 33 M.C.C. 537 (1942).
98. 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
99. A. W. Schaffer, 63 M.C.C. 247 (1955).
100. A. W. Schaffer, No. MC-93529 (Sub-No. 2), June 25, 1958.
101. A case containing language similar to that found in the Schaffer case
is A. J. Metler, 62 M.C.C. 143 (1953).
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In cases in which there is rail opposition one or more of the com-

plaints made by the shippers in the Schaffer case are usually found.
While the Commission may not always speak specifically in terms of
inherent advantages, these advantages are almost always present in

cases where a grant of authority results. Where they do not exist,
applications for motor carrier authority have been denied in spite of
the fact that the opposition came from rail carriers alone. The Commission has held that a showing that there is no available motor carrier service does not of itself require a finding of public convenience
and necessity. In a case involving the transportation of tractors it was
said:
The circumstances surrounding each proceeding are the criteria to
which we must look ....
Though shipper complains of some delays by
rail service, we note no specific instances of any losses of sales occasioned by such delays, or any other serious consequences. . . . To
deprive the rail carriers of the material volume they are now enjoying
for the advantages which may accrue to shipper by the use of motor
transportation is not warranted. 0 2
Transit time
As seen above in connection with cases involving existing jointline or rail service, transit time is an important consideration in many
application proceedings. Almost every shipper is interested in getting
his products to market as quickly as possible, and he will naturally
support the application of a carrier who promises him better service
than he has already available. Where the existing service is consistently slow, the Commission will give serious consideration to the
shipper's problems in this respect. In one case it appeared that available service, which was provided by two carriers in an interline arrangement, usually required eight to twelve days for a movement
which applicant professed to be able to perform in two to five days,
and the application was granted.'0 3 However, in another proceeding
where the evidence of delay did not establish a general pattern of
slow service but only two instances of late delivery, it was held that
applicant had failed to show that existing service was inadequate.
The Commission said:
Any motor carrier may occasionally be unable to deliver its shipments
promptly, because of some unforeseen contingency, and we believe that
two delays in transit mentioned do not indicate that service now available
is inadequate.104
The Commission also held that where a shipper makes unreasonable
102.
Hayes
103.
1957).
104.

Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., 52 M.C.C. 123, 126-7 (1950). See also
Freight Lines, Inc., 52 M.C.C. 303 (1950).
Dance Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ky.
Cordera Transfer Co., Inc., 27 M.C.C. 229, 232 (1940).
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demands on a carrier, such as requiring special equipment on very
short notice, or expecting delivery in an exceptionally short time,
the carrier's failure to conform absolutely to the shipper's require10 5
ments does not justify a finding that its service is unsatisfactory.
Where delay occurs because a carrier's pick-up schedules do not
meet the production schedules of a single shipper, the Commission has
refused to find that there is a need for an additional service, saying:
To allow additional carriers to enter a field already adequately served,
merely because the present carriers have not fixed their times of departure and arrival to meet the convenience of a single shipper, would
seriously threaten the economic stability of motor transportation.10s

Finally, when complaints of delays refer only to the inability of
carriers to provide occasional emergency service, it has been held that,
if service under normal conditions is reasonably satisfactory, no new
107
service should be authorized.
Other types of shipper evidence
In attempting to show that existing motor carrier service is inadequate shipper witnesses may offer a wide variety of testimony. A
shipper of fresh meat and meat products complained that protestant's
vehicles were not clean upon arrival for loading, and that they were
often rejected by Bureau of Animal Industry inspectors. As a result,
carcasses had to be bagged and walls of trailers covered, which meant
added expense and loss of time. It was found that protestant's service
was unsatisfactory, and applicant was granted the authority sought. 10 8
An application was denied in which the shipper's only complaint
about existing services was that the carriers failed to settle damage
claims promptly.109 A shipper will frequently make the contention
that if an application which it supports is not granted, it will commence, continue, or expand private carriage operations. It has been
held that evidence of this type indicates that available common carrier service is inadequate for the shipper's purposes." 0 However, in
a later case, the Commission has said that such evidence, although relevant and admissible, is entitled to but little weight."'
A situation arising in a very few cases is that in which public or
shipper witnesses testify on behalf of protestants to the effect that
the new service is not needed, or that it would disrupt the operations
of existing carriers who are rendering satisfactory service. In one
recent case the application was supported by a receiver of ground
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Bell Extension, 74 M.C.C. 590 (1958).
Clarance Tarbet, 31 M.C.C. 63, 68 (1941).
M & M Fast Freight, Inc., 68 M.C.C. 513 (1956).
Refrigerated Transport Co., Inc., 68. M.C.C. 591 (1956).
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 46 M.C.C. 765, 770 (1947).
Joe Duffey, 19 M.C.C. 674 (1939).
Orville C. Badger Trucking Co., Inc., 66 M.C.C. 373 (1956).
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limestone who was dissatisfied with existing rail service. However,

the shipper of the limestone also appeared, on behalf of protestants,
and testified that he had no motor vehicle loading facilities, did not
intend to install any, and would use motor service only as a last resort. Needless to say, this portion of the application was denied. 112

In another case," 3 evidence in opposition to an application for
authority to transport bulk petroleum was presented by four service
station owners and two distributors who testified that existing service

was adequate and that heavy tank trucks constituted a traffic hazard;
by a representative of a travel bureau who testified that existing highway conditions rendered the transportation of petroleum by motor
vehicle unsafe; and by a member of the South Dakota Public Utilities
Commission who testified that a grant of authority would have serious
adverse affect upon the railroads, which were in poor financial condition and needed to retain the considered traffic. This application,

too, was denied.
Evidence in support of a broad commodity or territorialgrant
A question which must frequently be resolved in application proceedings is whether an applicant should be granted authority to serve
all points in a specified state or area or whether he should be restricted
to service at one or more points designated by name. As a general
rule, evidence that a shipper is selling its products or is soliciting customers throughout a wide area has been found sufficient to warrant
a grant of authority to serve all points in that area. The fact that
shipments are not actually being made to every city in a state or
that a shipper witness testifies to shipments made to representative
points only will not ordinarily result in a grant restricted to service
at the points at which customers are presently located or which are
named by the witness. Where the shipper has a definite plan for
distributing its products throughout a broad territory the fact that
it is presently shipping to only representative cities in a state will
not preclude the possibility of an applicant's being granted authority
to serve the whole state." 4
A contrary result may be reached, of course if it is apparent that
there is no present or potential need for service beyond certain specific destination points, even where the points named are many and
the area involved relatively small. In a case in which an applicant
sought authority to serve all points within 150 miles of Boston and
Philadelphia, the authority granted was restricted to seventeen sepa112. Port Norris Express Co., Inc., No. MC-110841 (Sub-No. 7), April 30,
1958.
113. Arthur C. Bailey, Jr., 33 M.C.C. 537 (1942).
114. Colonial Refrigerated Transport Inc., 71 M.C.C. 359 (1957); Rogers
Cartage Co., 69 M.C.C. 423 (1957); Rowley Interstate Trans. Co., Inc., 67
M.C.C. 415 (1956). See also pp. 1065-66, supra.
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rate cities in that area. These were the only points to which the supporting shippers were actually shipping their products, and the Commission found that the possibility of a need developing at some future
date for service to other points was too speculative to warrant a grant
of a broader destination territory.115
A similar approach was taken by the Commission in E. Brooke Matlack, Inc.116 Applicant there sought authority to transport bulk liquid
commodities and liquified gas between all points in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. The application was supported by twenty-two shippers,
including major oil refineries, chemical manufacturers, and sugar refiners. The shippers mentioned many representative points to which
their products were shipped, and most testified to a need for tank
truck service on a year round basis for the transportation of substantial amounts of traffic. The application was opposed by an association of rail carriers, but there was considerable evidence of inadequacy of rail service and that tank cars were frequently in short
supply. The Commission granted the application in part, but greatly
restricted both the commodities and the territory authorized. In E.
Brooke Matlack, Inc. v. United States,117 the Commission's order was
set aside, and the case remanded for further proceedings. The court
took particular exception to the Commission's grant of authority to
transport liquid sugar from Philadelphia to nine named cities in
New Jersey. It pointed out that the uncontradicted testimony of the
shipper witnesses was to the effect that canneries using liquid sugar
were located throughout southern and central New Jersey, and that
their locations were prone to shift from year to year. The court
further stated that it should be common knowledge that New Jersey
was an area of many canning plants, and that it would unduly hamper
the shipper's conduct of their businesses to have their motor carrier
service restricted to a few destination points. In its report on reconsideration, the Commission granted applicant authority to serve
all points in seven New Jersey counties. 118
A somewhat similar problem arises in connection with applications
seeking authority to transport a wide class of commodities. As seen
above, 119 where a carrier serves a particular class of shipper, such
as the petroleum, chemical or meat packing industries, the Commission has favored the use of broad commodity descriptions in certificates. To further this policy, a number of commodity lists embracing products shipped by certain major' industries were established in
115. Refrigerated Transit, Inc., 52 M.C.C. 399 (1951).
116. 54 M.C.C. 809 (1952) (not printed in full).
117. 119 F. Supp. 617 (E.D. Pa. 1954).

118. E. Brooke Matlack, 63 M.C.C. 151 (1954).
119. See pp. 1063-64, supra.
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Descriptions in Motor Carrier Certificates.120 In appropriate cases,
applicants have been granted authority in terms of these lists. For
this to be done it must appear that a representative number of commodities belonging to a particular class will be shipped, but it need
not appear that the supporting shipper requires transportation service
for every item on a list in the Descriptions case. 121 However, where
service is actually required for the transportation of only a very few
familiar and easily describable commodities, the grant of authority
has been restricted to these individual items.12
The matter of broad as opposed to narrow territorial and commodity
grants takes on a somewhat different complexion when applied to
regular route general commodity carriers. These carriers, which hold
themselves out to the public in general to provide a scheduled service
on virtually all ordinary freight, have usually been granted commodity authority, corresponding to a common pattern embracing general commodities with certain standard exceptions, in spite of the fact
that their applications may be supported by shippers of a relatively
few commodities. In Ligon Extension,12 a number of general commodity carriers sought authority to serve as an off-route point the
plant of a manufacturer of aluminum. Although the shipper expressed a need for service on aluminum pigs and ingots only, all the
applicants were granted authority to transport general commodities.
The application in Huey Motor Express, 24 was for authority to transport general commodities over a specified regular route. It was supported by only two public witnesses; one a shipper of tea, spices, and
drugs, and the other a receiver of roofing materials, millwork, and
hardware. An immediate need was shown for service along the
described route in one direction only. Nevertheless, the applicant
was granted authority to transport general commodities in both directions over the route sought, the Commission commenting that it
would be inimical to the public interest not to authorize applicant to
render a complete service.
OTHER EVIDENCE RELATING TO PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
AND NECESSITY

Applications in which there is little or no public support
The Commission is sometimes faced with the situation in which an
applicant attempts to obtain authority without the support of shipper
120. 61 M.C.C. 209 (1952); 61 M.C.C. 766 (1953). See Maxwell Co., 63 M.C.C.
677 (1955).
121. Picha Extension, 68 M.C.C. 223 (1956); Cf. Rogers Cartage Co., 72 M.C.C.
329 (1957), where authority was granted to transport nitrogen fertilizer solutions rather than a particular grade of fertilizer solution known as "Nisol 80"
for which applicant had originally sought authority.
122. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 64 M.C.C. 358 (1955).
123. 71 M.C.C. 695 (1957).

124. 72 M.C.C. 350 (1957).
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witnesses or prospective passengers. It has consistently been recognized that certain classes of motor carriers, particularly those transporting such things as household goods or house trailers, must rely on
traffic which is sporadic in nature and which does not move with the
regularity of ordinary commercial shipments. This fact does not relieve an applicant of the necessity of proving that there is a public
need for the service which he proposes,
but it does mean that that
need may be proven otherwise than through the testimony of those
12
who have an immediate need for his service. In James P. Watson
no shipper witnesses appeared. The only evidence of need for the
proposed service consisted of copies of municipal records, submitted by
applicant, showing the number of removals in the area, and evidence
of a survey made by applicant showing the amount of equipment
operated by carriers in the area authorized to operate in interstate
commerce. Evidence that about 6,000 moves had been made in the
past year and that there were a total of twenty-six moving vans available to perform interstate moving was deemed sufficient to support a
grant of authority. However, where general evidence of the need of
a community for additional moving service is presented by witnesses
from banks, chambers of commerce, or trade associations, some fairly
definite evidence of the present volume of traffic and existing facilities
127
must be presented before an application may be granted.
It is well known that a great many local moving and storage concerns are associated with large household movers having nationwide
authority. The Commission has said that every application for authority to transport household goods must be decided on its own merits,
and that an applicant's position as a member or nonmember of a
van-line organization will neither prejudice nor improve his chances
of obtaining a grant of authority.2
In a case where an applicant relied solely on the fact that his equipment was extensively used by his
van-line principal as evidence to prove public convenience and necessity, however, the application was denied. 2 9
A few applications for authority to transport passengers or ordinary
freight have been granted in spite of the fact they are not supported by
members of the shipping public. In one case an applicant sought
authority to transport general commodities to a newly developed
harbor area. Although the only supporting witnesses were not themselves shippers but were members of the port authority, the application was granted on the basis of evidence of the volume of traffic
that would move through the new port, the number of shippers who
125. Arkansas Trucking Co., Inc., 68 M.C.C. 1 (1956).
126. 1 M.C.C. 277 (1936).
127. Redmond-Fairchild, Inc., 48 M.C.C. 375 (1948).
128. Community & Johnson Corp., 71 M.C.C. 351 (1957).

129. Russell Von Der Ahe, 51 M.C.C. 253 (1950); Cf. Morris Shuman, 21
M.C.C. 780 (1940).
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planned to utilize the new facilities, and the existing motor carrier
service. 130 Another carrier, which sought authority to transport automobiles from an air force installation to ports at which military personnel embarked for overseas assignments, was granted authority
by an officer charged
even though the application was supported only
131
with processing personnel for overseas duty.
It is even possible for an application to be successful in the absence
132
of any public witnesses whatever. In Capitol Bus Co., an applicant
which operated a scheduled passenger service between Scranton,
Pennsylvania, and Baltimore, through Gettysburg, sought authority
to operate between Gettysburg and Washington, thus enabling it
to perform a direct service between Scranton and Washington. The
only evidence of need for this service consisted of exhibits showing
the number of through tickets applicant had sold to passengers
traveling beyond Baltimore on other lines, and the number of tickets
issued by connecting bus lines to passengers from points south of
Baltimore and which applicant had honored. There was also evidence
that the service would be improved by eliminating the necessity of
changing buses at Baltimore. In granting the application the Commission pointed out the difficulty in obtaining evidence from prospective passengers:
The passengers involved in this case are in no sense regular customers of
applicant, and it undoubtedly has little, if any, knowledge of where they
reside; neither can it possibly foresee from whence its future passengers
in this service will come. The situation is not dissimilar to that encountered in the household goods moving industry. People move infrequently, and beyond those limited occasions they are not interested
in transportation for movement of their household effects. We have
long recognized the practical difficulties of presenting oral testimony of
witnesses in those cases, and there is no reason for doing otherwise
here.1 33
In another case involving passenger operations, an applicant sought
authority to conduct charter operations.'3 It already held authority
to operate over a certain regular route, and was therefore automatically authorized, under the incidental charter rights provisions of
section 308 (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act, to originate charter
parties from points in the territory served by its regular route operation to all points in the United States. It wished to abandon its regular
route service, and sought appropriate authority to continue its charter
business. No public witnesses supported the application, but evidence
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Ventura Transfer Co., 26 M.C.C. 712 (1940).
Pasha Common Carrier Application, 72 M.C.C. 383 (1957).
69 M.C.C. 447 (1957).
Id. at 451.
Deluxe Motor Stages, Inc., 72 M.C.C. 596 (1957).
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of applicant's past charter operations was received and held sufficient
to prove public convenience and necessity.
Other considerations affecting public convenience and necessity
The national transportation policy contains a provision requiring
the Commission to administer the Interstate Commerce Act so as to
promote "safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service.' 1 35 Accordingly, in Riss & Co., Inc.,1' the Commission found that public
convenience and necessity embraces all phases of the public interest,
and that, in appropriate cases, it may properly consider
[AJIl matters of every character affecting safety and the public interest,
including, among other things, the character of the traffic to be transported; the nature, condition, and adequacy of the highways, bridges,
and tunnels to be used; the extent of the traffic congestion on and in such
facilities; the location of proposed operating routes with respect to schools,
homes, hospitals, and essential industries and installations; the possibility
of resulting damage thereto in connection with the proposed operations;
and the extent that this Commission and other regulatory bodies are in
a position to police the movement of any hazardous traffic involved. 137
The Riss case is unique in the amount and variety of evidence presented regarding safety practices and traffic conditions. It involved
a large number of proceedings in which the applicants sought authority to transport explosives, primarily to and from certain government
installations. The principal supporting shipper was the Department
of Defense, and the applications were opposed by numerous carriers,
states, municipalities and organizations, including certain labor unions
and the Executive Committee of the Governors' Conference. The
evidence presented concerned such things as highway congestion,
the condition of highways and bridges, climatic and geographical
conditions, the likelihood and possible effects of destruction of bridges
and tunnels, the adequacy of the Commission's safety regulations, and
data concerning accidents involving the transportation of explosives.
The general import of the public evidence was to the effect that the
highways of many states were not adequate to handle efficiently their
present traffic, in that they were congested and in need of repair,
and that the transportation of explosives by motor vehicle constituted
a potential threat to the safety of the public. While conceding the
relevancy of this evidence, the Commission went on to point out that
the national transportation policy requires it ". . . to develop and
preserve a national transportation system . . . adequate to meet the
needs of our commerce and the national defense." 138 The need for
135. See note 13, supra.

136. 64 M.C.C. 299 (1955).

137. Id. at 309.
138. Id. at 325.
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motor carrier service was found, in certain respects, to outweigh the
safety hazards, and a portion of the authority sought by the respective applicants was granted.
Another evidentiary matter discussed in the Riss case was the admissibility of motion picture films as exhibits. 139 Certain protestants
sought to have films introduced into evidence to show the allegedly

careless manner in which motor carriers transported explosives. They
offered to project the films at the hearing and to show them at any
other time at the Commission's offices at the request of the other
parties. The examiner refused to receive the films as evidence, and

the Commission upheld his ruling on the grounds that it would be
difficult if not impossible to obtain accurate information from them

and because of the inconvenience of arranging for showings subsequent to the hearing for the benefit of opposing parties.
CONCLUSION

While it would be difficult, if not impossible, to state precisely what
evidence is necessary to prove convenience and necessity in motor
carrier application cases, Commission and court decisions have developed standards to guide the practitioner in the presentation of his
case. Proof of convenience and necessity is directed primarily to the
public need for additional service and the inability of existing
authorized carriers to provide the service. The evidence is also aimed
at considerations of applicant's fitness to render the service, including
such factors as safety of operation and equipment, financial ability,
and compliance with safety and other regulations for the protection
of the public interest.
Procedure is nontechnical and is governed by the Commission's
General Rules of Practice which provide that evidence admissible in
matters, not involving trial by jury, tried in the courts of the United
States, shall be admissible in Commission hearings. Administrative
bodies are not bound by strict rules governing the admissibility of
evidence and a decision will not be overturned because of the admission of immaterial, irrelevant evidence, or evidence of no probative
value. The Commission has generally taken a liberal approach to the
problem of the admission of evidence, requiring only that the best
evidence be presented. Hearsay evidence is generally admissible but
not as proof of the truth of the hearsay statement. Further, the Commission takes official notice of certain facts, such as the Commission's
own records which are not, strictly speaking, matters of record in
the proceeding before it.
The burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish, by substantial evidence, that public convenience and necessity require the
139. Id. at 311-12.
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granting of the authority sought. Applicant must show shipper need
for the proposed service, and, in addition, prove affirmatively that
existing authorized carriers can not or will not perform the service
in a manner satisfactory to the public. Even where the application
is unopposed, the applicant must present evidence showing a definite
need for the service he seeks authority to render.
The most common way of establishing a need for a proposed service
is through the testimony of shipper witnesses, or, in the case of bus
lines, potential bus passengers. This type of testimony is presented in
many different forms, depending upon the individual case. It may
show that the basis of the shipper's need is the fact that applicant is
already serving the industry to some extent and proposes to render a
complete service. In other cases, the shipper may want the applicant
to have authority to follow his traffic from one place or plant to another as production and distribution patterns change. The evidence
may be of a future need or seek to establish the advantages of singleline service as against presently authorized joint-line service. It may
relate to the shipper's need for one of two types of service-regular
route or irregular route-in preference to the other. The cost of
transportation may be an element of applicant's case and of the
shipper's need for the service. The inherent advantage of each mode
of transportation often is developed in the shipper testimony. Flexibility and time-in-transit are usually important factors upon which
evidence is presented. The scope of the grant of authority, both as to
territory and commodities, is governed by the proof as developed on
the record of the proceeding.
Under the national transportation policy promulgated by the Congress, "public convenience and necessity" embraces all phases of the
public interest and in a proper case, the Commission may receive in
evidence all matters relating to public need and public safety.

